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1. Overview  
The huge Rohingya refugee influx into Bangladesh is seen in the literature as likely to strengthen 
the position of the Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and her Awami League party. 
However, there are concerns that it will lead to further authoritarianism in the country, as well as 
fuel extremist sentiment. The Bangladeshi public are generally supportive of the government’s 
stance of allowing refugees in, but again there are concerns about the longer-term impact, 
particularly in the Cox’s Bazaar area. The literature highlights the fact that radical Islamist 
movements, notably Hefazat-e-Islam, are gaining from the crisis, and the potential for Rohingya 
refugees to be recruited by extremists/jihadists. There are also worries that the Rohingya crisis 
could fuel militancy in other countries in the region. In terms of regional relations, aside from the 
expected heightened tension between Bangladesh and Myanmar, the crisis is leading to a rift 
between Dhaka and New Delhi. China is seen as seeking to exploit the crisis to strengthen 
relations with Myanmar as well as Beijing’s own position in the region.   
Key findings are as follows:  
▪ So far Sheikh Hasina’s handling of the crisis is strengthening her domestic 
position – The literature indicates that the Bangladeshi public are generally supportive of 
the Prime Minister’s decision to allow Rohingyas into the country, and her party is gaining 
popularity as a result. This could translate into electoral success in the next national polls 
in early 2019.   
▪ Rising authoritarianism – There is concern that the government could use the crisis to 
continue along the path of authoritarianism (suppressing opposition groups, the media, 
freedom of expression) it has followed in recent years.  
▪ Concerns among public about protracted refugee presence – While supportive of the 
government, Bangladeshis – particularly in the Cox’s Bazaar area – are voicing worries 
about the impact of the refugee influx on jobs, prices, resources and the environment. 
The question about who will pay for the refugees is also paramount.  
▪ Island settlement and safe zones – In response to public concerns, the Government of 
Bangladesh has proposed settling the refugees on an uninhabited island far from the 
mainland. A second proposal is to establish safe zones in Myanmar so the refugees can 
return to that country. Both proposals have been criticised by rights groups.  
▪ Impact on Islamist groups – Hefazat-e-Islam, which has its headquarters in Chittagong, 
has an active presence in the affected Cox’s Bazaar region, and is building its national 
profile as a result of the crisis. However, it is a movement rather than a party, and the 
literature does not indicate that Islamist political parties are benefiting.   
▪ Potential for militant recruitment within Bangladesh – There is consensus in the 
literature that Rohingya refugees are vulnerable to recruitment by extremist/jihadist 
groups; indeed, Hefazat-e-Islam and Jamaat-e-Islami are reported to have been actively 
operating in refugee camps even prior to the current influx. 
▪ Potential to fuel militancy in the region – The literature indicates that anger at the 
plight of the Rohingya refugees could be used by extremist leaders in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and other countries in the region to fuel religious identity politics, and by groups 
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such as Al-Qaeda to promote extremist violence. The Bangladesh government has 
highlighted the security threat posed to India. 
▪ Indian stance on crisis angering Bangladesh – Motivated by key economic and 
strategic interests, India has been strongly supportive of the Myanmar government and 
only reluctantly expressed concern about the refugee crisis following protests from 
Bangladesh. Bangladesh has been angered by the Indian position, and there are signs 
that the growing bilateral tension is affecting wider regional initiatives, as well as pushing 
Bangladesh to seek closer ties with Muslim countries. 
▪ China seeking to use crisis to further geopolitical interests – Like India, China has 
vital geopolitical interests in Myanmar; it also sees the crisis as an opportunity to re-
establish close ties with Myanmar (following the latter’s drift to the West in recent years). 
China has therefore also been very supportive of Myanmar.  
The literature drawn on for this review was almost entirely comprised of newspaper articles/think 
tank pieces. Given the fact that the crisis is still unfolding, no academic literature was found on 
the current situation though the review did come across a few papers on the historic problem of 
Rohingya refugees. The review found no literature looking at the impact of the Rohingya crisis 
specifically from the gender perspective or from that of people with disabilities.   
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2. Bangladeshi politics 
Awami League-BNP rivalry  
Bangladeshi politics has long been characterised by rivalry between the two main parties: the 
Awami League (AL) led by Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by 
Khaleda Zia (Idris, 2017). The general consensus in the literature is that politically, Prime 
Minister Sheikh Hasina will be strengthened by the refugee influx – or rather by her handling of it 
– and her party, the Awami League, will benefit in the next parliamentary elections due to be held 
no later than 28 January 2019 (Lintner, 2017). Cookson (2017a) points out that, at least for the 
next six months, the refugee crisis will overshadow political developments and distract attention 
from electoral politics, constitutional amendments, and other such issues. Felix-Joehnk (2017) 
writes that, ‘Partly in response to the Rohingya crisis, which is widening existing political fractures 
in Bangladesh, Ms. Hasina continues to consolidate power’.  
A related point is that the crisis is enhancing Sheikh Hasina’s standing in the international 
community, with consequent positive effects on her popularity at home (Chowdhury, 2017). The 
Bangladeshi Prime Minister has been able to present herself ‘as the humanitarian, while her 
Myanmar counterpart, Suu Kyi has been obviously demonised as henchwoman of the killer 
Myanmar army’ (Chowdhury, 2017). There have even been calls within Bangladesh for Sheikh 
Hasina to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. By contrast, opposition leader Khaleda Zia has not 
been very visible in the context of the refugee crisis, and her party has been prevented from 
distributing relief (Chowdhury, 2017). Chowdhury (2017) cautions that it is too early to predict 
what will happen next, but so far, ‘domestic politics wise, its Sheikh Hasina who has come out 
looking better’. 
Authoritarianism 
The Awami League’s rivalry with the BNP has led it to adopt increasingly harsh measures to 
target its political rivals, and indeed to suppress any form of criticism (Idris, 2017). The literature 
reports extensively on human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, 
enforced disappearances, torture, beating and harassment of opposition groups. These have 
become more frequent as tensions with the BNP have escalated; opposition leaders and activists 
constitute a significant proportion of the victims of such abuses (ICG, 2016: 10-11). The ICG 
notes that the government appears bent on using law enforcement machinery to silence 
legitimate dissent and criticism. ‘Freedom of expression and civil liberties are under assault with 
restrictions on the media reaching proportions that are unprecedented and alarming’ (ICG, 2016: 
21). 
There is concern that the Rohingya crisis could facilitate further authoritarianism on the part of 
the government. ‘The Rohingya refugee crisis is shaking Bangladesh’s body politic to the core, 
and in ways that may hasten the country’s ongoing slide toward authoritarianism’ (Felix-Joehnk, 
2017).  
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Public opinion 
Nationwide support 
The literature suggests that public opinion in Bangladesh is broadly supportive of the 
government’s decision to allow Rohingya refugees into the country (Felix-Joehnk, 2017). 
Massive demonstrations in support of the Rohingyas have been held in several cities in 
Bangladesh (Lintner, 2017). Grassroots campaigns have sprung up across the country to collect 
donations for the refugees: ‘there is great sympathy for the Rohingya’s tales of persecution and 
abuse in largely Buddhist Myanmar’ (Alam, 2017).  
Concerns among population of Cox’s Bazaar 
But the literature also points to concerns about the protracted presence of such large numbers of 
Rohingya refugees in the country. ‘The impact on the southern part of Bangladesh along the 
border with Myanmar will be devastating’ (Cookson, 2017a). ‘Some in this already impoverished 
and overpopulated nation… have begun to worry that the staggering influx of people could sap 
Bangladesh’s resources and push the economy – and those already struggling to compete in it – 
to the brink’ (Alam, 2017). Local people are already voicing worries about the economic and 
security impact of the refugee influx (Hoekstra, 2017): 
▪ A citizen, who felt pride in the government’s response to the crisis, added: ‘With all these 
extra people the prices of food and transport have increased a lot over the past weeks. 
And I have concerns about our security. These refugees are so poor and hopeless. At 
some point they may go out stealing’. 
▪ A local pharmacist expressed fears that the Rohingya influx would lead to unfair 
competition in the job market: ‘This could be really bad for us. The Rohingya may take 
our jobs. They now have nothing and I’m sure they are willing to work for less money 
than we do’. 
▪ A teacher called for a quick solution, fearing that otherwise serious problems could arise: 
‘We don’t have enough land here to settle all these people. It will be a disaster if they 
have to stay for a long time’.  
Cookson (2017a) warns that the refugees will not be able to return to Myanmar in the next one to 
two years, and adds that ‘it is unlikely that they will ever return’. As the refugee presence 
becomes more permanent, and as the economic impact of the influx – particularly locally in the 
Cox’s Bazaar area - becomes apparent, public opinion could well shift to becoming more hostile 
to the refugees and the government. 
Worries about economic impact 
Cox’s Bazaar is a traditional tourism destination within Bangladesh, but the refugee influx will 
negatively impact tourism revenue to the area (Cookson, 2017b). It will also negatively affect the 
environment and natural resources. Referring to the Rohingya refugees who have been in 
Bangladesh for several years, Rahman (2010: 237) notes: ‘The high number and prolonged 
residence of refugees increases the rate at which land and resources are used up, a process 
which accelerates environmental degradation and in turn leads to greater competition between 
natives and refugees for scarce land and resources’. In the current influx, the government claims 
the forests cleared for new refugee camps were worth USD 18 million (Alam, 2017). It will cost 
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tens of millions of dollars to provide for the Rohingya refugees, and there are fears that this 
burden will fall on Bangladesh (Alam, 2017). A Bangladeshi economist complained that, ‘The 
figure we get from the UN is huge, and only a portion is coming from aid agencies and [the] 
international community. What will Bangladesh do for the rest?’ (Khondaker Moazzam, cited in 
Alam, 2017). 
Economic losses due to the refugee crisis will be countered to some extent by the influx of 
foreign aid workers. Foreign aid inflows and increased expenditures necessitated by the crisis 
could even have an expansionary effect on the Bangladesh economy with more rapid economic 
growth (Cookson, 2017b). Parnini (2013: 288) points out that much of the economic burden of 
providing for previous Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh has been borne by UNHCR, donor 
governments and NGOs: ‘if anything, the UNHCR relief operation has led to a net financial gain 
for the Bangladesh government and its citizens, as it has increased employment’. Nonetheless, 
given the vast scale of the current influx and the likely protracted nature of the crisis, 
Bangladeshis have serious worries about its economic toll.  
Other options: island settlement and safe zones 
One option being considered by the Government of Bangladesh, likely in response to the 
concerns about the economy and security being voiced by local people, is to settle the Rohingya 
refugees on an uninhabited island, Thengar Char1, off the coast of Noakhili district (Sen, 2017). 
With an approximate area of 40 square kilometres, Thengar Char only emerged from the sea 
about 11 years ago: it lacks basic facilities and agricultural conditions are not suitable for 
subsistence farming (Sen, 2017). Moreover, its location is quite remote – it can only be reached 
by a two-hour boat journey from the Bangladeshi mainland. The government’s intention is to first 
move those Rohingya refugees who came to Cox’s Bazaar following disturbances in Rakhine last 
year, i.e. from refugee camps at Kutapalong and Nayapara (Sen, 2017). 
There are reports that the Government of Bangladesh has been trying to mobilise international 
support as well as funding for its rehabilitation initiative, including ‘a sensitisation drive with 
foreign missions and their diplomats in Dhaka as well as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees with a view to gain international acceptability’ (Sen, 2017).  
Not surprisingly, the government’s rehabilitation plan has come in for strong criticism, not least 
because it would violate the principle of non-refoulement, whereby refugees cannot be forcibly 
sent back to the places from where they have fled or to locations against their will. There is also 
the risk, given the inhospitable conditions on the island, that refugees will seek to leave and head 
to countries further east such as Indonesia, as well as to the Indian Sunderbans in the west (Sen, 
2017). As well as the dangers involved in long sea journeys, the refugees would face further 
challenges in whichever country they were able to reach – and vice versa.  
A second option being proposed by the Government of Bangladesh is to establish safe zones 
within Myanmar, enabling the refugees to return to that country. According to Bangladeshi media 
reports, Dhaka wants India, Germany, the UN and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
to set up this zone (Mitra, 2017). This proposal too has come in for strong criticism, with Human 
Rights Watch claiming that safe zones ‘rarely if ever live up to their name’ (Hoekstra, 2017). It 
cites the experiences of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sri Lanka, ‘pointing out that in both countries 
                                                 
1 This is referred to in another article as Bhashan Char (Hoekstra, 2017). 
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large numbers of civilians were executed in safe zones’ (Hoekstra, 2017). The safe zone option 
is unlikely to materialise, not least because allowing the Rohingya back would undermine the 
Myanmar government’s main assertion ‘that there is no such ethnic group as Rohingya and 
those living in the country have illegally migrated from Bangladesh’ (Alam, 2017).    
3. Religious extremism 
Islamist groups 
Appeasement of Islamist movements and parties has been a characteristic of Bangladeshi 
politics for some time, practised by both the Awami League and BNP. One of the leading Islamist 
movements, Hefazat-e-Islam, has staged demonstrations with hundreds of thousands of people 
in Dhaka calling for sharia law, separation of the sexes, and death sentences for atheists. The 
government has done little to confront the movement (Idris, 2017). Indeed, Hefazat-e-Islam 
successfully blocked government regulation of its madrassahs2 (ICG, 2016: 7) and blocked laws 
protecting women’s rights, e.g. a law proposing equal inheritance rights for men and women 
(Allchin, 2016, cited in Idris, 2017).   
The Bangladeshi government’s decisions to allow refugees into the country ‘could upset the very 
precarious balance between secularism and religion in Bangladeshi politics’ (Felix-Joehnk, 
2017). Hefazat-e-Islam has its headquarters in Chittagong, in the area of Bangladesh adjacent to 
Rakhine in Myanmar, from where the Rohingya have fled. The movement has called for the 
liberation of Rakhine, and has threatened to wage ‘jihad’ on Myanmar ‘if the army and its 
associates do not stop torturing the Rohingya Muslims’ (Felix-Joehnk, 2017). Felix-Joehnk 
(2017) argues that the Rohingya crisis is giving Hefazat-e-Islam a greater role in Bangladeshi 
national politics, and putting liberalism under threat. However, there is little evidence that Islamist 
political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami are benefiting from the crisis. 
Security threat from militant groups 
Within Bangladesh 
The literature highlights the potential for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh to be recruited by 
extremist groups. This stems in part from previous experiences of Rohingya refugees already in 
Bangladesh. In January 1998, for example, armed refugees thought to be from the Rohingya 
Solidarity Organisation (RSO) seized the Nayapara refugee camp; three were killed in clashes 
with Burmese security forces near the Bangladesh border (Ullah, 2011: 154). Also in 1998, 64 
refugees were jailed after clashes with police (Ullah, 2011: 154). Lintner (2009, cited in Ullah, 
2011) claims that existing Rohingya camps (for refugees who fled to Bangladesh in earlier 
years), were being run by Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HuJI). He points to connections between 
militant groups in Bangladesh and those in Myanmar: for example, Jamaat-i-Islami has been 
known to finance the RSO (Ullah, 2011: 156).  
The militancy potential of refugees is echoed by Rahman (2010: 235): ‘The Rohingya camps in 
Cox’s Bazaar District are fertile grounds for recruitment by Islamic militants. With little love for 
Myanmar, and alienated from Bangladesh, the stateless Rohingyas are vulnerable and 
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desperate, and likely become militant in an effort to uphold their interests’. Similarly, a risk 
assessment conducted by USAID in 2012 warned that the plight of both Rohingya and Bihari 
refugee communities in Bangladesh – denied citizenship rights and facing persecution – could 
make them susceptible to recruitment by extremist groups (USAID, 2012, cited in Idris, 2017).  
Fair and Oldmixon (2015) also claim that militant groups related to Jamaat-e-Islami have been 
actively recruiting from Rohingya refugees in the past, and are doing so in the context of the 
current refugee influx. They warn that, ‘As the Rohingya crisis continues to deepen, Bangladesh 
will become ever more attractive to an array of Islamist militant groups seeking to recruit the 
hapless victims of the Burmese government’ (Fair & Oldmixon, 2015: 5).  
Cookson (2017b) sees militancy among Rohingya refugees as inevitable: ‘Why would you think 
otherwise when the young men have seen their families abused and killed? Young men will seek 
outlet for their anger. Most Rohingya will find solace in God and in prayer. ISIS agents and 
promoters of fundamentalist views will try to corrupt the Rohingya and lead them towards 
violence’.  
Rahman argues that the way to prevent long-term encampment of refugees and militarisation of 
Rohingya camps is to ‘make the Rohingya community workable by uplifting them educationally, 
socioeconomically and politically’ (2010: 238). He calls for a refugee law that gives the 
Rohingyas work permits, and even short term dual citizenship (Rahman, 2010: 239). But given 
the much bigger numbers of Rohingya entering Bangladesh in the current wave, and the 
sensitivities around allowing refugees to integrate with the local population, it is unlikely the 
government will follow this course. Cookson (2017b) urges the government to focus on measures 
to prevent indoctrination of young men and women by jihadist recruiters, and highlights the 
importance of the education system in this effort. 
In the region 
One analysis sees the Rohingya crisis as fuelling jihadist sentiments in other countries in the 
region, notably Indonesia and Malaysia (Singh & Haziq, 2016). Calls for ‘jihad’ in Myanmar were 
made by extremist groups in all these countries following the 2012 Rohingya refugee influx into 
Bangladesh, and the authors claim ‘a similar jihadist flare-up is now developing in the wake of 
the latest atrocities reported’ (Singh & Haziq, 2016: 2). They cite evidence for this from 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Pakistan. In Indonesia, for example, ‘the Indonesian online jihadist 
community even furnished their Facebook pages with various Rohingya-related propaganda 
posts and pictures, including a map which provides a possible travel route for potential 
Indonesian jihadists to enter Myanmar via Aceh’ (Singh & Haziq, 2016: 3). 
Such warnings of the regional security implications of the Rohingya refugee crisis are echoed 
elsewhere, with it seen as ‘threatening to deepen sectarian tensions across the region…..as 
Muslim communities…grow increasingly angry over the treatment of Muslim Rohingya by 
Buddhist Rakhine’ (Japan Times, 2017). The paper argues that politicians in countries such as 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Bangladesh and India could exploit such sentiments, and promote identity 
politics, thereby increasing the risk of religious conflict. Al-Qaeda has urged Muslims in 
Southeast Asia (including Bangladesh) to support the Rohingya in Myanmar ‘financially, militarily 
and politically’ and has warned that: ‘The savage treatment meted out to our Muslim 
brothers…shall not pass without punishment. The government of Myanmar shall be made to 
taste what our Muslim brothers have tasted’ (Japan Times, 2017). 
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The Government of Bangladesh has highlighted the security threat posed to India, in particular, 
by the militancy potential of the Rohingya refugees – this is part of its efforts to pressure India to 
address the crisis (see below). The Bangladesh High Commissioner in Delhi said Dhaka wanted 
‘our friends to help us for the sake of peace and security in the region’, implying that the security 
situation could worsen due to the refugees becoming ground zero for Islamist groups looking for 
fresh recruits (Mitra, 2017). As one analyst put it: ‘You can argue for security to say that this has 
impact for India’s own security. So what is happening there [in Bangladesh] will spill over for 
India’ (World Bank adviser on regional integration cited in Mitra, 2017). 
4. Regional relations 
The Rohingya crisis is having a strong impact on Bangladesh’s relations with Myanmar, but also 
with other countries in the region, most notably India.  
Bangladesh-Myanmar 
The Rohingya issue has long overshadowed bilateral relations between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar. Persecution of Rohingyas in Rakhine over the past few decades led to periodic 
refugee influxes into Bangladesh. In the initial refugee influxes, tripartite talks between the 
governments of Bangladesh and Myanmar and the UN led to the majority being repatriated 
(Rahman, 2010), but in later years most stayed in Bangladesh. Before the current crisis an 
estimated 200,000-400,000 Rohingya refugees were already living in Bangladesh (Rahman, 
2010: 235; Cookson, 2017a). Other historic sources of tension between the two countries include 
disputes over maritime boundaries, arms trafficking and cross-border movement of armed 
insurgents (Parnini et al, 2013). Not surprisingly, bilateral trade between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar has been limited, amounting to USD 100 million in 2010 (Parnini et al, 2013: 142). 
However, there were signs of improvement in bilateral relations from 2011. During Prime Minister 
Hasina’s visit to Myanmar at the end of that year, the Myanmar president expressed willingness 
to cooperate with Bangladesh on resolving the Rohingya issue and agreed to take back 
documented Rohingya refugees (Parnini et al, 2013: 141). In January 2012 the Government of 
Myanmar specified that it was willing to take back 9,000 out of the 28,000 registered Rohingya 
refugees encamped in Cox’s Bazaar. (Parnini et al, 2013: 141). The maritime boundary dispute 
between the two countries was resolved peacefully through international arbitration in March 
2012, ‘allowing Bangladesh to stake its claim over the resource-rich Bay of Bengal’ (Parnini et al, 
2013: 141). Had the commitments by Myanmar on the Rohingyas been fulfilled, there was 
optimism that bilateral trade could grow to USD 1 billion by 2014 (Parnini et al, 2013: 142).  
With the current massive outflow of Rohingyas into Bangladesh, those hopes have clearly been 
dashed, and relations with Myanmar look set to be extremely tense for the foreseeable future. 
Bangladesh-India 
Indian stance on Rohingya crisis 
India has to date strongly supported the government of Myanmar. As well as fears that the 
Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh could travel further to India, New Delhi needs 
Myanmar’s cooperation to combat insurgents in India’s north-eastern states, who use Myanmar 
as a base (Hasnain, 2017; Alam, 2017). India also has strong economic and strategic interests in 
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Myanmar, for example the India-funded Kaladan multi-modal project which is designed to provide 
a sea-river-land link to its remote northeast through Sittwe port (Bhaumik, 2017). This has led 
one analyst to write that India is actually using the crisis to improve relations with Myanmar 
(Lintner, 2017). In an official visit to Myanmar in September 2017, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi did not mention the refugee crisis, but rather expressed concern about ‘extremist 
violence’ in Rakhine, and solidarity with the Myanmar government in its fight against terrorism 
(Lintner, 2017; Mitra, 2017).  
India has also said it will expel the roughly 40,000 Rohingya already living in the country (Alam, 
2017; Japan Times, 2017). The government told the Indian Supreme Court, which is hearing a 
challenge against the decision, that their presence poses ‘a threat to national security’. Of the 
40,000 Rohingya in India, nearly 15,000 have received refugee documentation, but India wants 
to deport all of them (Japan Times, 2017). The move has been strongly condemned by the UN 
(Bhaumik, 2017).  
Anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh 
The Indian stance on the Rohingya crisis has led to anger in Bangladesh. New Delhi’s threat to 
deport Rohingyas in India was not well received in Dhaka. The failure by Narendra Modi to 
address the refugee crisis facing Bangladesh during his visit to Myanmar aroused particular 
anger. Soon after that visit, the Bangladesh High Commissioner in Delhi met the Indian Foreign 
Secretary; in a subsequent public statement the former stressed that the refugees were 
Myanmar’s responsibility and said regional neighbours should ‘use their good offices to emphasis 
this point to the Myanmarese government, about the ground reality’ (Mitra, 2017).  
India did later issue a statement expressing concern about the outflow of refugees from Rakhine 
(Mitra, 2017), and it has been sending humanitarian assistance to Chittagong. However, some 
argue that the motivation in this is less to help Bangladesh as to further Indian interests. 
Constantino Xavier (cited in Japan Times, 2017) argues that, as well as reflecting ‘India’s 
increasing willingness and capacity to act as a first responder to emergencies in the region’, the 
aid indicates ‘its preoccupation in stemming the refugee flow in Bangladesh, reducing their 
incentives to cross the border into India’.   
According to the literature, the sentiment gaining ground in Bangladesh is that India is giving 
priority to its strategic goals in Myanmar: ‘In a sense, Bangladesh’s strategic problems are being 
sacrificed for the meeting of those goals. So people are saying that we have done so much for 
India in terms of meeting its security concerns but now that we have a security problem, India is 
shying away and focusing only on its own security’ (World Bank adviser on regional integration, 
cited in Mitra, 2017). Chowdhury (2017) notes that among Bangladeshi citizens ‘popular 
perception is rather anti-Indian’. There is disappointment and frustration with India because of 
Bangladesh’s previous support for that country, and because India had been seen (prior to the 
crisis) as ‘a special friend’ of Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2017; Mitra, 2017). Alam (2017) argues 
that the crisis: ‘is stoking divisions along pro- and anti-India lines within the government and 
between some government factions and the army. Principally it is bringing out distrust of 
India….in the Bangladesh army and so complicating civilian-military relations in Bangladesh’.  
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Impact on regional initiatives 
There are signs that the growing tension between Bangladesh and India is having wider 
ramifications. On the one hand it is pushing Bangladesh to seek closer relations with Muslim 
countries in the ASEAN region and the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), as well as the 
West and the UN (Mitra, 2017). One analyst (Rashid, cited in Mitra, 2017) claims that India’s 
‘disregarding [of] the Rohingyas’ plight’ is fuelling not just anti-India feelings within Bangladesh 
but also Islamist rhetoric. On the other hand, it is affecting other regional initiatives. In early 
September, India dissociated itself from the Bali Declaration of the World Parliamentary Forum of 
Sustainable Development after clauses were introduced by Turkey (seconded by Bangladesh) on 
the Rohingya crisis (Mitra, 2017). In the same month Sheikh Hasina used a speech to 
BIMSTEC,3 ostensibly a platform for economic cooperation, to highlight the challenges faced by 
Bangladesh in relation to the Rohingya refugee influx (Mitra, 2017). 
China 
Like India, China has vital geopolitical interests in Myanmar. The country provides China with 
access to the Indian Ocean: China is funding Kyauk Phyu port, which is to be the starting point of 
an oil-gas pipeline and road link from the Bay of Bengal, through Myanmar to Yunnan province, 
shortening supply routes from the Middle East (Bhaumik, 2017; Lintner, 2017). The port is part of 
two projects, which also include a trading estate, to develop a special economic zone in Rakhine 
(Bhaumik, 2017). China’s ambitious Belt and Road development initiative4 is thus heavily 
dependent on good relations with Myanmar. A further factor is that China has been worried by 
Myanmar’s shift towards the West in recent years – criticism of Myanmar by the West over its 
treatment of the Rohingyas is seen in Beijing as an opportunity to re-establish close ties with the 
country (Lintner, 2017). Beijing has therefore been a vocal supporter of the Myanmar 
government. In March this year it stopped the introduction of a UN Security Council resolution 
against Myanmar (Mitra, 2017). Lintner (2017) argues that the crisis could strengthen China’s 
position in the region.   
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